Revitalizing The Militia Can Promote Monetary Reform Part 2

PART ONE of this Commentary described the social, economic, and political consequences of a breakdown in the monetary and banking systems….

Throughout all of this, the Establishment will endeavor to maintain control by crackdowns–with whatever level of intimidation and violence may be necessary to keep a lid on dissent, civil disobedience, and other disorders. This is neither a guess nor a prediction, but rather an observation. The Establishment is the only major group in this country that has a plan which it is putting into practice right now for dealing with a monetary and banking crisis: namely, erection of a national police state under the guise of “homeland security”.

Of course, a police state can provide no real solution for a monetary and banking crisis. Quite the contrary. Imposition of a national police state will merely exacerbate the problem. A police state will bring America nothing but a continuation of unsound money and dishonest banking. Worse yet, a police state will prevent common Americans from protecting themselves against monetary looting, and punish those who try to do so, while protecting the acaparadores (political looters) even more than they are being protected now. In the long run, though, even the most vicious police state will break down, because nothing it can do can prevent the phony systems of fiat currency and central banking from collapsing beneath it. So a police state cannot provide a “solution” even from the Establishment’s myopic point of view, only an hiatus during which the situation will become an order of magnitude more explosive and less containable.

On the theory that one should light a candle rather than curse the darkness, the foresightful can point to a glimmer of hope in all this. As bad as it is, this situation presents both a set of dangers and an opportunity. In the long term, the danger is a monetary and banking crisis. In the short term, the danger is a police state. Most Americans may not understand the money and banking problems facing them. But they do understand and even hate a police state. In that rests their opportunity.

The essence of today’s “political correctness”–that is, goodthinking according to the Establishment’s lights–is to eschew “hate”. What, though, is “hate”? According to the dictionary, “hate” is “intense hostility and aversion usually deriving from fear, anger, or sense of injury”. Well, should every American not fear a police state? Should every American not be angry that any politician or bureaucrat is trying to impose one? Should every American not feel injured in such circumstances? A police state is political evil incarnate. So, should not it, and those who promote and administer it, be the subjects of intense hostility and aversion?

Unfortunately, hostility and aversion by themselves are only a reaction, not a plan. What is the antidote to the police state now being set up in this country? The only antidote is revitalization of “the Militia of the several States”. I say again: The only antidote to a police state in this country is revitalization of “the Militia of the several States”. Print out this page and save it, so that when a police state has been set up, you can read it once more, and realize that you knew the answer when there was still time, even if you did nothing about it. Especially if you did nothing about it.

In addition, revitalizing “the Militia of the several States” may be the best way to begin reform of the monetary and banking systems before it is too late, and thereby avoid confrontation with a police state entirely. “To begin reform before it is too late” is the key insight. After the crisis reaches an advanced stage, mere reform of existing institutions will not suffice. The only alternative will be reconstruction from scratch upon the rubble of a collapsed society. That is, if nothing is done soon, the precondition for change will be a financial and economic disaster. It will be necessary to see the country destroyed in order to save it. Then a desperate need for the Militia will arise. The essence of strategy, however, is to avoid fighting pitched battles if victory can be attained by other means. If revitalized in time, “the Militia of the several States” could help to avert, or could mitigate, a monetary and banking crisis, and at least would be prepared to intervene when such a crisis breaks out.

For constitutional monetary and banking reform to take place through the free market, a “big player”–which consists of many individuals and commands significant economic resources–must begin to use silver and gold as its media of exchange. A “big player” could be an institution that already exists, or one that can be organized quickly and comprehensively throughout a large geographical area or legal jurisdiction. A “big player” that already exists could be a State. But it may not be politically possible to enact a State electronic gold currency bill in time.[2] Therefore, patriots need to organize alternative institutions that can grow out of the private sector, but will exercise some governmental authority. “[T]he Militia of the several States” are just such institutions. Their foundations can be laid in localities throughout each State in the form of private Citizens’ Homeland Security Associations, which will educate the public and State legislators on the need to revitalize the Militia, and will develop models of how the Militia should be organized. When the necessary statutes are enacted, the Associations could become the first “independent companies” incorporated in the Militia.

Now, obviously neither the Militia nor their proponents in Citizens’ Homeland Security Associations can initially be organized around the issue of money and banking, because so few people understand that issue. That the Militia could theoretically function as “big players” is not enough. There must also be a “big issue”, other than the impending crisis in money and banking, on the basis of which these “big players” can be organized and activated. Fortunately, that “big issue” already exists: namely, “homeland security”. This “big issue” can serve as the basis for revitalizing the Militia. Then, once the Militia have emerged as potential “big players”, they can address the monetary and banking crisis as part and parcel of “the big issue”–which of course it is, as the homeland cannot possibly be secure while suffering the throes of monetary and banking crises.

Preparing for a monetary, banking, and even general economic collapse is part of the Militia’s ultimate mission to resist foreign invaders or domestic usurpers and tyrants. In a “resistance economy”:

• Two economies will exist side by side: the collaborationist economy aboveground, and the patriotic economy underground. The underground economy will function as the economic arm of the Resistance. The collaborationist economy will provide the practical accommodation with the occupying regime necessary for the population to survive. But it will also serve the Resistance–for example, as a cover for supply of goods and services to the underground economy, as a source of intelligence, and as a locus for interference with the forces of occupation.

• Because patriots’ incomes, business and personal transactions, and other financial matters cannot be fully disclosed or reported, patriots will avoid the use of banks or like institutions that operate as arms of, interface with, report to, or are monitored or under surveillance by the occupying regime.

* Large supplies of normal “cash” will not be available through licit channels. The regime will order banks to supply “cash” to and receive it from established customers only, and then only consistent with the customers’ proven patterns of business, and with the bills being recorded by serial numbers and their progress through the economy thereafter traced. Large “cash” transactions in stores will be subject to reporting requirements that identify the purchasers and the nature of their transactions.

• Normal “cash” will be employed in underground transactions only if it also can be used in the aboveground economy–which will be difficult, because its holders will not be willing to explain where they obtained it. In addition to these problems, “cash” will not be trusted because of rampant inflation, fear of sudden currency call-ins, both domestic and foreign exchange controls, and widespread computerized surveillance of monetary transactions. Moreover, holders of legal, but rationed or otherwise particularly scare, goods and services offered in the underground economy will be unwilling to sell for “cash”. And few people will accept “cash” in outright illegal transactions–particularly trade in firearms and ammunition that the regime has banned.

• The preferred currency of the Resistance in the underground economy will be silver and gold. Specie coins bear no identifying serial numbers, and leave no paper or electronic trails. They are not easily destroyed. They are not subject to inflation, call-ins, or “demonetization” by decree. And, because they will not be used in the aboveground economy, they are never subject to surveillance or reporting.

• Thus, overall, a “resistance economy” will engender two parallel monetary systems: one, the collaborationist system, based on the “cash” the forces of occupation impose on society; the other, the Resistance system, based on silver and gold. When the occupation regime is overthrown, only the latter will survive.

Self-evidently, in preparing to operate in a “resistance economy”, “the Militia of the several States” will also ready themselves for any monetary and banking crisis short of a “resistance economy”, because the characteristics of a “resistance economy” are not far different from those to be expected in any economy experiencing a monetary and banking collapse. In particular, in such a crisis the country will suffer massive unemployment, bankruptcies, deranged markets, trade at a standstill, financial institutions closed or operating on sporadic schedules, “cash” either limited to what people happen to have in their own possession (in a depressionary collapse) or unlimited in amount but rapidly depreciating in purchasing power (in an hyperinflationary collapse)–and, in the face of all this, political impotence, gridlock, or chaos. Under these circumstances, attempts at usurpation and tyranny by politicians, bureaucrats, and allied special-interest groups will be the order of the day. And, if any of these succeed, the country will be plunged into a “resistance economy.”

What could revitalized “Militia of the several States” do right now?

First, the Militia could take steps internally to protect their own members against monetary and banking crises. Militiamen could be

    educated in the use of silver and gold as media of exchange and stores of value;

    required to maintain in their personal possession minimum stocks of silver and gold coins, viewing these as no less important than their firearms, ammunition, and other accoutrements;

    encouraged to establish within their communities economic enclaves in which individuals could employ silver and gold as media of exchange when other currencies failed;

    assigned the task of developing a parallel structure of prices, expressed both in silver and gold and in paper currency, for common goods and services within those localities;

    requested actually to transact business in silver and gold whenever possible (although this experiment should first to conducted in a State with no income or sales tax, so as to simplify accounting matters).

Second, the Militia could exert organized political pressure for monetary reforms–such as adoption of a State electronic gold currency bill–in their respective States.

But the first step is to revitalize “the Militia of the several States”. Without those institutions in operation, everything else is wishful thinking.